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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 
VIACOM INTERNATIONAL INC., COMEDY PARTNERS, 
COllliTRY MUSIC TELEVISION, INC., PA~MOUNT 
PICTURES CORPORATION, and BLACK 
ENTERTAINMENT TELEVISION LLC, 
Plaintiffs, 
07 . 2103 (LLS) 
against-
OPINION 
YOUTUBE, INC., YOUTUBE, LLC, and 
GOOGLE INC., 
Defendants. 
x 
Defendants having renewed ir motion for summary 
judgment, s Opinion responds to the Apri 1 5, 2012 direction 
of the Court of Appeals, Viacom Int'l Inc. v. YouTube Inc., 676 
F.3d 19, 42 (2d Cir. 2012), ng to 
. allow the parties to ef the following issues, 
with a view to permitting renewed motions for summary 
judgment as soon as practicable: 
(A) Whether, on the current record, YouTube had 
knowledge or awareness of any specific infri s 
(including any clips in suit not express noted in 
this opinion) ; 
(B) 	 Whether, on current record, YouTube willfully 
itself to specific infringements; 
(C) Whether YouTube had the "right and ability to 
control" infringing act ty wi thin the meaning of § 
512 (c) (1) (B) i and 
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(D) Whether any clips in- t were syndicated to a 
third party and, if so, whet such syndication 
occurred "by reason of t storage at the direct of 
user" within the meaning of § 512 (c) (1), so that 
YouTube may claim the protection of the § 512(c) 
harbor. 
Familiari with the COUyt of Appeals opinion, and my 
opinion at 718 F. Supp. 2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) is assumed. 
(A) 
WHETHER, ON THE CURRENT RECORD, YOUTUBE HAD KNOWLEDGE 
OR AWARENESS OF ANY SPECIFIC INFRI~GEMENTS (INCLUDING 
ANY CLIPS-IN SUIT ~OT EXPRESSLY NOTED IN THIS OPINIO~) 
Pursuant to the first item, I requested the ies to 
report, for each cl in- t, "what pYecise infoymation was 
given to or Yeasonably apparent to YouTube identi the 
locat or site of the infri ng matter?" (Tr. Oct. 12, 2012, 
p. 29) YouTube submitted a list of 63,060 clips in- t, claimed 
it nevey yeceived notices of any of those 
s, and challenged aintiffs to fill in the blanks 
specifyi how they claim such notice was given. 
In its response, Viacom stated that 
It has now become clear that nei ther side possesses 
the kind of evidence that would allow a clip by-cl 
assessment of knowl Defendants apparent 
are unable to say which clips-in- t they knew about 
and which they did not (which is hardly surprising 
:Viacom's Jan. 18, 2013 !'1em. Of Law In Opp. ':0 Def.'s Renewed Mot. for Summ. 
J. ("Viacom Opp."). 
2 
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given the volume of material at issue) and apparent 
lack ewing or other records that could establish 
these facts. (Viacom Opp. p. 8, fns omitted) 
Viacom recognizes " that acom has led to come 
forward with evidence establi ng YouTube I s knowl of 
specific cl in suit." (Viacom Opp. p. 9) 
That does not matter, Viacom says, because it is not 
Viacom's burden to prove notice. Viacom argues that YouTube 
claims the statutory safe harbor as a defense, and t fore has 
the burden of est ishing each element its affirmat 
defense, including lack of knowl or awareness Viacom's 
clips-in suit, and has not done so. Plaintiffs' thesis is 
st clearly and simply: "If there is no evidence allowing a 
jury to separate the cl -in suit that Defendants were aware of 
from those were not I there is no basis applying the 
sa harbor affirmat de to any of the cl II (Viacom 
Opp. p. 2) 
Plaintiffs elaborate (Viacom Opp. pp. 8 9): 
The Second Circuit vacated this Court's 
summary judgment regarding actual knowl or 
awareness because "a reasonable juror could conclude 
that YouTube had actual know 1 of specific 
inf ng act ty, or was at least aware of facts or 
circumstances from which specific infringing act ty 
was It Viacom, 676 F. 3d at 34. It remanded 
a further assessment of the evidence relating to 
whether this knowl extended to Viacom's clips-in 
sui t. Id. It has now become clear t neither side 
possesses the kind of evidence that would allow a 
clip by-cl assessment of actual knowl 
3 
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Defendants ly are unable to say which ips-
suit they knew about and whi they did not (which 
is hardly surprising given the volume of material at 
issue) and apparently lack viewing records that could 
est ish these facts. It llows, given t 
appli e burden of proof, that they cannot claim the 
512(c) sa harbor-e ially in light of the 
uminous evidence showing that the Defendants had 
considerable knowl of the cl s on their website, 
including Viacom-owned mat al. 
The is ingenious, but its foundation is an 
anachronistic, pre Digit Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) , 
concept. Title II of the DMCA (the Online Copyright 
Infringement Li lity Limitation Act)2 was enacted because 
ce providers perform a useful function, but the great 
volume of works aced by outsiders on t ir platforms, of whose 
contents service provi were generally unaware, might 
well contain copyright-i ringing material which the service 
provider would mechanic ly "publi " thus ignorant incurring 
liabili r copyright law. The problem is cle 
illustrated on the record this case, whi establi s that 
" . site traffic on YouTube had soared to more than 1 billion 
ly video views, with more t 24 hours of new video uploaded 
to the site every minute", 676 F.3d at 28; 718 F. Supp. 2d at 
518, and the natural consequence that no ce provider d 
possibly be aware of the contents of such video. To 
17 U s.c. § 512 
4 
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encourage qualifi service provi rs, Congress in t DMCA 
established a "safe harbor n ect the se ce provider from 
monetary, unct or other table reI ief for i ngement 
of copyright in the course of se ce such as YouTube' s . The 
Act places the burden of notifying such service provi of 
l ngements upon the copyright owner or s It 
requires such notif ions of claimed infringements to be in 
writing with specified contents directs that deficient 
notificat shall not be considered dete ng whether a 
service provider has actual or constructive knowl Id. § 
(3) (B) (i) . As stated the Senate at pp. 46-47, House 
Report at 55 56 see 718 F. Supp. 2d at 521) 
Subsection (c) (3) (A) (iii) requires that the copyright 
owner or its authorized agent provide the service 
provider with information reasonably sufficient to 
permit the service provider to identify and locate the 
allegedly inf ng material. An example of such 
ficient information would a copy or cription 
of the legedly inf ing material and the URL 
address of the location ( page) which is all to 
conta the infringing mat al. The of this 
provision is to provide the service provider with 
adequate information to find address the allegedly 
ringing mat expeditiously. 
Viacom's argument that the volume of material and "the 
absence of record evidence that would allow a jury to decide 
which clips-in suit were specifical known to senior YouTube 
executives ll (Viacom Opp. pp. 9 10) combine to deprive YouTube of 
the statutory safe harbor, is extravagant. aintiffs' 
5 
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assert, nei ther side can termine the presence or absence 
speci f ic infri s because of the volume of material, that 
merely demonstrates the sdom of the 1 islative requirement 
that it be the owner of the copyright, or his agent, who 
identifies the infringement by giving the service provider 
notice. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (c) (3) (A) . The system is entire 
workable: In 2007 Viacom it f gave such notice to YouTube of 
infringements by some 100, 000 vi s, which were taken down by 
YouTube by the next business day. See 718 F. Supp. 2d 514 at 
524. 
Thus, the burden of showing that YouTube knew or was aware 
of the specific infringements of the works in sui t cannot be 
shifted to YouTube to sprove. Congress has termined that 
the burden of identifying what must be taken down is to be on 
the copyright owner, a determination which s proven 
practicable in practice. 
aintiffs' acknowl that they lack "the kind of 
evidence that would allow a cl -by clip assessment of ac 
knowledge" (Viacom Opp. p. 8) suppl ies the answer to item (A) 
aintiffs lack proof that YouTube had knowl or awareness of 
any specific infringements of cl -in suit. 
So the case turns to whether there are substitute 
ents. 
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(B) 
WHETHER, ON THE CURRENT RECORDS, YOUTUBE WILLFULLY 

BLINDED ITSELF TO SPECIFIC INFRINGEMENTS 

In general, the law has long included the doctrine of 
"willful blindness. /I As the Court of Appeals st in this 
case (676 F.3d at 34-5) 
"The principle will 
tantamount to knowledge is y 
NJ Inc. v. Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 
novel. u 
110 n.16 
is 
Cir. 2010) (collect cases) i see In~e Aimster 
., 334 F.3d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 2003) 
is knowl in copyright law . 
as it is the law ly.U). A person is 
"will ful bl ind" or engages in "conscious avoidance" 
amounting to knowledge where the person "'was aware of 
a high probability of the fact in dispute and 
consciously avoi irming fact. '" United 
States v. na-Marshall, 336 F.3d 167, 170 2d 
Cir.2003) (quoting United States v. Rodri 2, 983 
F.2d 455, 458 (2d Cir.1993)); cf. Global Tech 
Inc. v. SEB S.A., --U.S.---, 131 S. Ct. 
71, 179 L. . 2d 1167 (2011) (applying the 
willful blindness doctrine in a ent inf ngement 
case). Writ in the trademark i ringement context, 
we have held that "[aJ service provi is not 
permi t ted will blindness. When it has reason to 
suspect users its service are infringing a 
protected mark, it may not sh ld itself from learning 
of the particular infri ng transactions by looking 
the other way." Tif ,600 F.3d at 109. 
The Court recognized that: 
§ S12(m) is explicit: DMCA safe harbor protection 
cannot be tioned on affirmative monitoring by a 
service provider. For that reason, § S12(m) is 
incompati e with a broad common law duty to monitor 
7 
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or otherwise out l ing act ty sed on 
awareness that ingement may be occurring. 
Id. at 35. Nevertheless, willful blindness is not t same as 
an affirmative duty to monitor, and the Court held ibid. that 
the willful blindness doct may be ied, 
in appropriate circumstances, to demonstrate knowledge 
or awareness ific instances of l ringement 
under the DMCA. 
Applying t doctrine, however, requires at tent ion to its 
scope. In imputing knowl the will ly sregarded fact, 
one must not impute more knowledge than the fact conveyed. 
Under appropriate circumstances imputed knowledge the 
willful -avoided fact may impose a duty to make further 
inquiries that a reasonable person would make but that 
depends on the law governing the factual situation. As shown by 
Court of Appeals' discuss of " flags," under the DMCA, 
what disqualifies service provider from the DMCA's 
protection is blindness to "specific and identifiable instances 
of infringement." 676 F.3d at 32. 
As the Court of Appeals held id. at 30-31) 
In particular, we are persuaded that the basic 
operation of § 512(c) requires knowl or awareness 
of specific infringing act ty. Under § 
512 (c) (1) (A), knowledge or awareness one does not 
disqual ify the service rather, the provider 
t gains knowledge or awareness of infringing 
activity ret safe-harbor ection if it "acts 
expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the 
material." 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (1) (A) (iii) Thus, 
nature of removal obI ion i tsel f contemplates 
8 
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knowledge or awareness specific inf nging 
materi because expeditious removal is poss e only 
if the s ce provider knows h parti arity which 
ems to remove. I to require expedit 
removal in the absence of specific knowledge or 
awareness would be to mandate an amorphous igat 
to "t commercially reasonable steps" in response to 
a generalized awareness of infringement. Viacom Br. 
33. a view cannot be reconcil with the 
language of the statute, which requires 
"expeditious[]" action to remove or di e "the 
mate al" at issue. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (1) ) (iii) 
(emphasis added) . 
Here, examples prof by aintiffs (to which they 
claim YouTube was willful blind) give at most information that 
infringements were occurring with part ar works, and 
occasi indications of promising areas to locate and remove 
specific locations of infringements are not supplied: 
at most, an area of search is identified, YouTube is le to 
find inf ing cl 3 As st in UMG v. 
- .........~~.-.------ ............--~-----
Shelter tal Partners LLC, No. 10-55732, 2013 WL 1092793, at 
*12 (9th Cir. Mar. 14, 2013) ("UMG 111/), 
Although t parties agree, in retrospect, that at 
times there was infringing material available on 
Veoh's services, the DMCA recognizes that service 
providers who do not locate remove infringing 
materials they not specifi ly know should not 
suffer loss of safe protection. 
Plaintiffs often suggest that YouTube can readi locate the infringements 
by us its own identification tools. It had no to do so. The Court 
of s explicit held that "YouTube cannot be excluded from the safe 
harbor by dint of a decision to restrict access to its proprietary search 
mechanisms. N 676 F.3d at 41. 
9 
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The Karim memorandum states infringing cl some 
well-known shows "can still be " but does not i ify the 
specific cl saw or where found them. Wilkens 
declaration tted by pIa iffs asserts that re were over 
450 such cl on YouTube at time! and some of 
them contai the infringing matter seen by Mr. m. To find 
them would re YouTube to locate and review over 450 clips. 
The DMCA excuses YouTube from doing that s Under § 
512(m), in the appli e section of t DMCA shall be 
const to require !s "affirmat seeking facts 
indicating infringing activi " 
Mr. Karim!s memorandum s not tie his ervations to any 
specific clips. Application of the e of will 
bl ss to his memorandum thus does not e knowledge or 
awareness infringement specific cl suit! out of 
450 1 e candidates. Nor does any example tendered 
by aintiffs. 
As Court of s stated (676 F.3d at 34) 
definition! current cl in suit are at issue 
in s litigation. Accordingly! we vacate the 
ing summary j and instruct District Court 
to determine on remand whether any specific inf s 
of which YouTube knowledge or awareness correspond to 
the clips-in-suit in these actions. 
There lS no ng of willful indness to specific 
ingements of cl in suit. 

10 
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(C) 
WHETHER YOU'::'UBE HAD THE "RIGHT AND ABILITY TO CON'::'ROL" 

INFRINGING ACTIVI'::'Y WITHIN THE MEANING OF § 512(c) (1) (B) 

servlce provi lS presumed by the DMCA to the 
ability to remove (or access to) material post on its 
website, and to exercise that function in its daily business, 
including removal of ringing mate in response to take-
down notices Viacom, 676 F.3d at 37) So the ability to 
"control infringing activity," even without knowledge of 
more" just ordinary power overspeci ics, means " 
der's website (id. at 38). The Courtwhat on the 
s perce two pointers toward what "somethingof 
more" is (ibid.) e omitted) : 
To date, only court has found that a service 
provider had right ability to control 
infringing act under § 512 (c) (1) (B) . In Perfect 
10 Inc. v. Ventures Inc., 213 F. 2d 
...--~'------- ............. ---~------------------~------
1146 (C.D. Cal. 2002), the court found control where 
service insti tuted a moni toring program 
by which user websites rece "detailed instructions 
regard [ing] issues of 1 appearance, and 
content." Id. at 1173. service also 
forbade cert types of content and refused access to 
users who iled to comply with its instructions. Id. 
Similarly, inducement of copyright infr under 
Metro-Gol Studios Inc. v. Ltd. , 
545 U.S. 913, 125 S. Ct. 2764, 162 L. Ed.2d 781 
(2005), which "premises liability on purposeful, 
culpable expression and conduct," id. at 937, 125 S. 
Ct. 2764, also rise to the level of control 
under § 512 (c) (1) (B) . Both of these es involve 
a service der exert substantial influence on 
the act ties of users, without neces - or even 
11 
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frequently acqui knowl of ific 
infringing activity. 
Ninth Ci tin UMG 111,2013 WL 1092793, at *19, 
following Viacom, held that 
in order to have " ability to control," 
t service provider must "exert[] substantial 
influence on the act t of users." "Substantial 
influence" may include, as the Second Circuit 
suggested, high levels of control over activities 
users, as t. Or it may lude purposeful 
conduct, as in Grokster. 
The concept is that a provider, even without 
knowledge of specific infringing activity, may so influence or 
partic e in that act ty, while gaining a financ benefit 
from it, as to lose the safe harbor. By its example of 
extreme Grokster case as what "might also rise to the I of 
control under § 512 (c) (1) (B)" (676 F.3d at 38), t Viacom Court 
of Appeals intact its "first and most important" 
determination (id. at 30) that the DMCA requires "actual 
knowledge or awareness facts or circumstances that indicate 
specific and identifiable instances infringement" before 
disqualifying a ce provider from t sa harbor id. at 
32) As quoted above, Ninth Circuit requires "high levels 
of control" over activities of users as in or 
"purposeful conduct" as in Grokster. It found those elements in 
Columbia Indus. v. No. 10 55946, 2013 WL 1174151, at *20 
(9th Cir. Mar. 21, 2013), where the record was 
12 
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replete th instances of Fung act ly encouraging 
by urging his users to both upload and 
particular 
to 
works, providing 
assistance to those watch copyrighted 
fi helping his copyrighted materi 
onto DVD. 
213 F. Supp. 2d at 1170, 1173, 1182, 
ce der presented both its f and its users as one 
affiliat network of websi tes a "unified brand," 
In 
it users "extensive ce" and "detailed instructions" 
on content, prescreening submissions and refusing access to users 
"until comply with its ctates" "to control the quali of 
, /I The court d it thus partic its 
exercised theusers' ringing act site 
" ng more" id. at 1181 1182) 
But the governing e must remain clear: of 
prevalence of infring ty, and welcoming it, s not 
its f forfei t the safe To forfei t that, provider 
must influence or partic in the infringement. 
Thus, where the ce provider's influence s not "take 
form of prescreening content, rendering extens advice to 
users regarding content ting user content," Wolk v. Kodak 
Network Inc. , 840 F. Supp. 2d 724, 748 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), 
or where the se ce r lists items for sale by users but 
"is not actively invo in the listing, ng, sale and 
livery of any item, " ckson 
13 
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1082, 1094 (C.D. Cal. 2001), and "does not preview products 
to ir listing, does not edit the product de ions, 
does not suggest prices, or otherwise involve itself the 
sale," Corbis v. Amazon.com Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 
------------~~------------------~-------
1110 (W.D. Wash. 2004) , its influence on users is not 
partic ion in their infringing activi and s not amount 
to the red "control" beyond normal abili of 
service provi r to ide what appears on its platform. 
The plaintiffs claim that the "something more" this case 
is establi by YouTube's llingness that its service be used 
to infringe, and by YouTube 's exercise of "ul t e editorial 
judgment and control over the content lable on the site" 
(Viacom Opp. p. 42)/ as shown by , s cisions to remove 
some but not a 1 infri ng material, by its ef s to 
and faci itate search of appearing on the site, 
by its ement of rules prohibiting, pornographic 
content. 
The plaintiffs begin with evidence 	 to its 
sition, YouTube reached internal cisions which i ringing 
materials to i ify remove from the site4 to avoid looking 
4 YouTube 	 employees used various methods to manually review submissions for 
infringements (see RSUF ~~ 63-66, 126 127, 269, 272-273). There is 
no evidence that any YouTube emp viewed and failed to remove any 
particular infringing clip in suit while conducting such reviews (see Part A 
above at p. 6). 
14 
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"Ii a dumping ground copyrighted st fff and "becomi 
another boys or stupi " (E-mails Jawed Karim, 
Steve , and Chad Hurley Sept. 3, 2005) or "Bittorrent" 
(E-mail from Chad Hurley to Steve Chen and Karim dated 
June 26, 2005), without ri drops in "site traffic and 
virality" (E mails between Jawed Karim, Steve Chen, and Chad 
Hurley 3, 2005) YouTube's decided 
to "take down whole movies, ff "entire TV shows, like an entire 
family guy sode" (id.), "South Park, and full I anime 
episodes," "nudity/porn and any death videos," but to leave up 
"music " "news programs," (E-mail from Brent Hurley to 
Cuong Do dat Nov. 24, 2005), " s, commercials" (E-mails 
between Jawed Steve Chen, and Chad Hurley dated 3, 
2005), and " cl ips (Conan, Leno, etc.)" (E- I from Jawed 
Karim to Steve Chen dated 1, 2005) . then 
"disabled communi flagging for " (Viacom Opp. at 
41), declined to develop a feature "to send automated email 
alerts to owners when illegal content was oaded" 
(Viacom 2010 Br. at 11), and ly stopped arly 
monitoring its site for infringements, iding instead "to keep 
substantially all infringing videos on the si te as a draw to 
users, unless and until YouTube rece a 'takedown notice' 
from the actual copyright owner identifying a specific 
15 
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infringing clip by URL and demanding its removal from the site R 
id. at 7). 
Plaintiffs further claim that Google "adopt YouTube's 
copyright policy" (Viacom Opp. p. 41) of primarily waiting to 
receive takedown notices before removing infringing materi 5 in 
order to "\ grow playbacks to 1b/day [one Ilion per day]' If 
(Viacom 2010 Br. at p. 17), gain advertising revenue, and enter 
licensing agreements on favorable terms with content owners 
including Viacom. For certain owners (including Viacom), the 
defendants streamlined the notification process by providing 
access to YouTube's Content Verification Program, which "allowed 
content owners to check boxes to signate individual videos for 
take down" (RSUF ~~ 214-215). But YouTube would only use 
digit fingerprinting software, which automatically blocks 
submissions matching "reference abases of fingerprints of 
copyrighted works ll prior to their becoming available for publ 
view ~~ 283, 285), to filter "videos infringing the works 
5 Plaintiffs claim that the defendants "manually screened narrow subsets of 
YouTube videos" for infringing material (RSUF ~ 273), i. e., videos uploaded 
by applicants to and participants in YouTube's Director Program and its User 
Partner Program. Both programs offered certain perquisites to original 
content creators, and YouTube appears to have monitored such clips to ensure 
that participants were in fact uploading their own content and not 
content created by others .). YouTube also monitored its site for 
infringements us hash-based identification technology, which ffs 
claim could only remove clips "exactly identical in every respect to a video 
clips that YouTube had previous removed pursuant to a takedown notice," and 
thus blocked only a limited subset of infringing clips id. at ~ 274). 
16 
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content owners who agreed to licensing and revenue 
sharing deals with YouTube" 6 (id. , 295) Thus, plaintiffs 
conclude, ess they were awarded a content license, 
Defendants re to prevent illegal upl ng and imposed the 
entire burden on Viacom and other studios to search 
24/7 for infri clips" (Viacom 2010 Br. at p. 28). 
That evi proves YouTube business reasons 
much of "burden on Viacom and the other s s to 
search YouTube 24/7 for inf ing clips." That is where it lies 
the safe (Viacom, 676 F.3d at 41) : 
As previous noted, § 512( provides that safe 
harbor protect cannot conditioned on "a service 
der moni ng its ce or affirmatively 
seeking facts indicating l nging activi except 
to the extent consistent a standard technical 
measure compl ng with the sions of ion 
(i).1f 17 U.S.C. § 512(m) (1) (emphasis ). In 
other words, the safe harbor sly discla any 
affirmative toring requirement to the 
extent that monitori comprises a "standard 
t cal measure" within the meaning of § 512 (i) . 
ch 
ing to accommodate or ement a "standard 
cal measure" exposes a service r to 
lity; re l to provi access to sms by 
a service provider affirmatively its 
own network no such resul t . In this case, the 
class plaintiffs make no that the content 
i ification tools implemented by YouTube constitute 
"standard techni measures,u that YouTube would 
exposed to 1 ility under § 512(i). For that 
Plaintiffs make the same argument YouTube's 
metadata search , which could conduct automated searches at 
regular intervals for videos matching provided by content owners 
(RSUF ~ 299). 
of 
17 
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reason, cannot be excluded from t safe 
harbor by dint of a decision to restrict access to its 
proprietary mechanisms. 
YouTube's decisions to restrict its monitoring efforts to 
groups of l lng cl like its isions "to 
rest ct access to its proprietary mechanisms," do not 
excl it from the s harbor, ess of their mot ion. 
ntiffs' rema evidence control goes no 
than normal funct of any service provider, shows 
nei icipation in, nor coercion of, user ingement 
act 
PIa iffs point out that YouTube's search technol 
facilitat access to ing material by suggesting terms 
for users to add to their query, which assists "users in 
locat ringing by providing variations 
complete name or content owner of a copyr work even 
the user not typed 's or owner's 1 name" (id. ~~l 
338-339) , by present viewers wi links to cl 
"'related' to a video that a user watches" id. at ~ 334), whi 
"likely will rect" a user viewing "an i ng cl ip from a 
major media company like acorn" to "oth.er s lar infri ng 
videos" at ~ 335) But evidence so establish.es 
YouTube's technologies are an "automat system" 
"users alone se" to view infringing content, that YouTube 
18 
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does "not participate ln those decisions," and that YouTube 
therefore does not control the infringing activity. Capitol 
Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, 821 F. Supp. 2d 627, 645 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) 
The only evidence that YouTube may have steered viewers 
toward infringing videos is as follows: YouTube employees 
regularly selected clips to feature "with conspicuous 
positioning on its homepage" (RSUF ~ 331), and on two occasions 
chose to highlight a clip-in-suit. YouTube asserts, without 
contradiction, that the creators of the work contained ln the 
first clip-in-suit, "the premiere of Amp' d Mobile's Internet 
show 'Lil' Bush,'" made the clip available on YouTube, and that 
YouTube featured the second clip-in-suit, "a promotional video 
from comedy group Human Giant entitled "Illuminators!,"' on its 
homepage at the request of Human Giant's agent (id. ~ 332). No 
reasonable ] ury could conclude from that evidence that YouTube 
participated in its users' infringing activity by exercising its 
editorial control over the site. 
Thus, during the period relevant to this litigation, the 
record establishes that YouTube influenced its users by 
exercising its right not to monitor its service for 
infringements, by enforcing basic rules regarding content (such 
as limitations on violent, sexual or hate material) , by 
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facilitating access to all user stored material rega ss 
without actual or construct knowledge) of it was 
infringing, and by t its site for some 
material and assist some content owners in their efforts to 
do the same. is no that YouTube induced its 
users to submit inf ded users with detailed 
tructions about what content to upload or edited their 
content, prescreened ssions for quali ty, steered users to 
infringing videos, or se interacted with infringing users 
to a point where it might be said to participated in their 
infringing activity. 
As the Ninth Circuit stat in UMG III, 2013 WL 1092793, at 
*19, regarding Veoh, another online atform for user-submitted 
s: 

In this case, Veoh's interactions with and conduct 

toward its users did not rise to a level. As 
recognized, "(a) all infringing 
on Veoh's systemj (b) Veoh the 
remove such material j (c) d have 
and did implement, filteri systemsi and 
could have searched entially 
content. II UMG II, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1112. 
are not equivalent to the 
activi ties found to consti tute substantial I uence 
in t and Grokster. Nor has UMG, in its initi 
or supplemental briefing to this court, poi to 
ot dence raising a genuine issue of materi 
fact as to whether Veoh's activities involved 
"some ng more than the ability to remove 
access to mat als posted on a service 
ite./I Viacom, 676 F.3d at 38 (quot 
Matz 
al resided 
to 
(d) 
circumstances 
ock 
Records, Inc. v. MP3Tunes, LLC, 821 F. Supp. 2d 627, 
20 
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635 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25,2011)); cf. v. Demand 
Media Inc., No. 11 Civ. 2503 (PKC) , 2012 WL 2189740 
(S.D.N.Y. June 13,2012) (citing the y~~~C?1"[1 examples 
and holding, "No evidence s a conclusion that 
the defendant exerted such close cont over content 
posted to [the website]. Bas on the evidence 
at summary judgment, no e j d conclude 
that the defendant exercis over user 
submissions sufficient to remove it from the safe 
harbor provision of section 512 (c) (1) (B) .") . 
YouTube did not have the and ability to control 
infringing activity within ng 0 f § 512 (c) (1) (B) . 
(D) 
WHETHER ANY CLIPS IN SUIT WERE SYNDICATED TO A THIRD 
PARTY AND, IF SO, WHETHER SUCH SYNDICATION OCCURRED 
"BY REASON OF THE STORAGE AT THE DIRECTION OF THE 
USER" WITHIN THE MEANING OF § 512 (c) (1) , SO THAT 
YOUTUBE MAY CLAIM THE PROTECTION OF THE § 512(c) SAFE 
HARBOR 
The Clips del to zon Wireless were not clips-
suit. 
There was no ot instance in which, as in the zon 
Wireless agreement, YouTube manually selected videos which it 
copied, took f the YouTube system, and delivered by hand so 
that the rec ient make them available from its own 
system. 
YouTube has entered into licenses with Apple, 
Panasonic, TiVo and AT&T under which YouTube provided access to 
material stored on its system at the direction users 
21 
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transcoding, to a accessible by third party mobile and 
s lar technology, all of the stored on YouTube's 
system. As explai in YouTube' s ef in of its 
mot (Dec. 7, 2012, p. 52) 
YouTube's syndication agreements merely give users 
alternative ways to view videos users have s 
on YouTube's system. They reflect the reality t 
today connect to online ces not just 
personal computers, through an 
singly broad range of devices, including mobile 
tablet computers like Ie's iPad 
Internet-enabled television sets. To ensure 
users can watch uploaded to YouTube no matter 
hardware they has ente 
into licenses wi providers that 
allow users of those ces to access videos direct 
from YouTube's system. Solomon Decl. ~ 3i 
Opp. Ex. 325 (36:24-37:9, 39:713j Schwartz 
Ex. 9 (23:13-25:9lj VRYCS ,~ 324-327. Because 
can ayed on such are s 
in proper file format, 's system 
automatically transcodes user-uploaded deos into 
formats compatible various thi party devices. 
Solomon Opp. Decl. ~ 3i Schwartz Ex. 9 (48: 11-16, 
57 : 2 2 2 ) VRY C S ~ ~ 3 2 0 , 330. 's standard 
syndication 1 icenses involve no manual select 
of Vl by YouTube, the videos accessible via 
the t -party devices at all times rema stored on 
and accessed only from YouTube's system. 
This " cationU serves the purpose of § 512(c) by 
"providing access to material stored at the rection of users,H 
676 F. 3d at 40, quoting UMG I, 620 F. .2d at 1092, 
entails nei manual selection nor del of videos. As 
YouTube argues (Defs.' Br. p. 53), the syndication does 
nothing more than two functions that the 
Second Circuit has found to be ected by 
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the sa harbor: (1 ) "transcoding" "in a 
different encoding in order to r the video 
Vl e over the Internet to most usersi" and (2 ) 
pI back videos "in response to user request. II 
points outl without cont ction thatl 
online service providers have equivalent licensing agreements. 
Plaintiffs argue that the 
critical feature of these thi party syndication 
deals that takes them outside the scope of the safe 
is that were entered into sua sponte 
YouTube for its own business purposes l and not at the 
rection of users. was acting sua 
in its own self-interest and for its own 
ial benefit in ente 0 all of thesel 
iness transactions. (Viacom pp. 51-52) 
On t contrarYI t critical feature of these transactions 
is not the identity of the party i tiating them but that theyl 
are steps by a se ce provider taken to make user stored videos 
more ly access e (without intervent from its 
em to those us contemporary hardware. They are therefore 
cted by the § 512(c) safe 
CONCLUS ON 
Each of the above issues being concluded in favor of 
defendants the renewed motion for summary judgment is 
ed. 
The CI shall enter judgment that defendants are 
ected by the safe- provisions of the D 
l 
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Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) from all of 
plaintiffs' copyright infringement cIa and accordingly 
dismissing the complaint, th costs and disbursements to 
defendants according to law. 
So red. 
DATED: 	 New York, New York 
April 18, 2013 
l~ L. 	S;'..j,..."
"--'--"'--­
LOUIS L. STANTON 
U. S. D. J. 
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